Incentivizing Postmarketing Pharmaceutical Product Safety Testing with Extension of Exclusivity Periods by Kushner, Leslie
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 19 Volume XIX 
Number 2 Volume XIX Book 2 Article 4 
2008 
Incentivizing Postmarketing Pharmaceutical Product Safety 
Testing with Extension of Exclusivity Periods 
Leslie Kushner 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leslie Kushner, Incentivizing Postmarketing Pharmaceutical Product Safety Testing with Extension of 
Exclusivity Periods, 19 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 519 (2008). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol19/iss2/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Incentivizing Postmarketing Pharmaceutical Product Safety Testing with 
Extension of Exclusivity Periods 
Cover Page Footnote 
The author would like to thank Professors Jeanne Fromer and Benjamin Zipursky for their guidance and 
comments on drafts of this Note. 
This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol19/iss2/4 
VOL19_BOOK2_KUSHNER 2/18/2009 2:59:29 AM 
 
519 
Incentivizing Postmarketing 
Pharmaceutical Product Safety Testing 
with Extension of Exclusivity Periods 
Leslie Kushner* 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 520 
I. DEFECTIVE DRUGS REACH THE MARKET RESULTING IN  
HARM .................................................................................... 522 
A. Current Safety Testing of Pharmaceuticals is  
Inadequate .................................................................... 523 
B. Some Risks of FDA-Approved Pharmaceuticals Are 
Discoverable by Postmarket Research ......................... 528 
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF REGULATION DISINCENTIVIZES 
CONTINUED SAFETY TESTING OF PHARMACEUTICALS .......... 532 
A. Desire Not to Lose Too Much Exclusivity Period......... 534 
B. Desire Not to Shrink Market as Result of Narrowing 
Consumer Base ............................................................. 537 
C. Expense of Additional Testing Not Balanced by Cost of 
Products Liability Risk.................................................. 539 
III. SOLUTION: INCENTIVIZE POST-APPROVAL SAFETY TESTING 
WITH EXTENSION OF MARKET EXCLUSIVITY......................... 544 
A. The Proposal................................................................. 544 
B. Extension of Exclusivity is a Successful Incentive ........ 546 
C. Alternative Solutions Do Not Work .............................. 548 
1. Products Liability is Insufficient to Ensure  
Safety..................................................................... 548 
2. Fines Become Cost of Doing Business ................. 551 
3. Strengthening Requirements for FDA Approval is 
Too Costly ............................................................. 551 
VOL19_BOOK2_KUSHNER 2/18/2009  2:59:29 AM 
520 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:519 
 
 
4. Tax Incentives Are Not Focused on the  
Problem ................................................................. 553 
CONCLUSION................................................................................. 555 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent withdrawal of Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
approved drugs from the market, increased safety warnings of 
FDA-approved drugs, and highly publicized pharmaceutical 
products liability litigation have drawn attention to the mechanism 
by which the FDA and pharmaceutical manufacturers evaluate the 
safety of FDA-approved drugs.  A report from the Institute of 
Medicine1 suggests the FDA has not effectively monitored the 
safety of pharmaceuticals subsequent to initial approval for use and 
recommends changes to the process by which the FDA monitors 
postmarketing-adverse-event-surveillance.  The congressional 
response, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007,2 enhances the ability of the FDA to implement a plan for 
periodic postmarket evaluation of pharmaceuticals and enforce the 
obligation of manufacturers to perform FDA-requested postmarket 
safety studies via penalties or fines.3  This plan, however, fails to 
provide incentives for pharmaceutical manufacturers to employ 
important ongoing postmarket safety evaluation of their drugs. 
A PDF version of this Note is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2940.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; Ph.D., Biochemistry, 
City University of New York.  The author would like to thank Professors Jeanne Fromer 
and Benjamin Zipursky for their guidance and comments on drafts of this 
Note. 
1 COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE US DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. OF MED. OF THE 
NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH 
OF THE PUBLIC (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton, Sheila P. Burke, eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY]. 
 2 Food and Drug Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 3 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2007). 
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Like other businesses, the pharmaceutical industry is driven by 
the profit motive.4  Profitability of pharmaceutical companies is 
dependent on balancing the costs of identifying, developing, 
patenting, testing and obtaining approval to market a new drug 
with the ability to market the drug at a reasonable price during the 
patent term.5  In part because the industry generates huge profits,6 
it has been severely criticized for focusing on profitability at the 
expense of the consumer7—in terms of both price protection8 and 
safety.  Nonetheless, the pharmaceutical industry is, in fact, an 
economic enterprise driven by maximization of profits.9  
Consequently, postmarket safety evaluation of pharmaceuticals 
must be profitable in order to ensure compliance. 
This Note proposes a promising mechanism of ensuring more 
crucial postmarket safety evaluations of pharmaceuticals by 
extending the exclusive marketing period—normally limited to the 
patent term—as a reward.10  Extending the exclusivity period has 
been demonstrated to be an effective incentive for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to perform additional studies,11 while having no 
impact on the timing of the initial FDA approval for marketing.12  
The expense of post-approval testing is likely to be balanced by 
ample earnings during the reward period, making the choice of 
performing such testing economically attractive.  In addition, the 
benefit to consumers resulting from the increase in safety of 
marketed pharmaceuticals counteracts any negative financial 
 4 See Richard A. Epstein, What’s Good for Pharma is Good for America, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/ 
2006/12/03/whats_good_for_pharma_is_good_for_america. 
 5 See id. 
 6 The pharmaceutical industry generates about $250 billion in revenue. See id. 
 7 See generally MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW 
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005). 
 8 Americans spent more than $200 billion on prescription drugs over the past year. 
See IMS Health, http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/pages/homeFlash/us/0,2764, 
6599,00.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (providing statistics on retail pharmaceutical 
sales, updated monthly). 
 9 See Epstein, supra note 4. 
 10 See infra Part III.A. 
 11 See infra Part III.B. 
 12 Since the extension period and the additional studies would occur after the drug has 
been FDA approved, it would have no effect on the timing of initial FDA approval for 
marketing. 
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impact on consumers that extended exclusivity may cause.13  
Moreover, market exclusivity applied to marketed products 
stimulates further innovation and development of those and related 
products, resulting in a general benefit to the health of the 
population.14 
Part I of this Note discusses the problem of drugs reaching the 
market with undiscovered, but discoverable, risks that result in 
harm to consumers.  Part II of this Note explains how the 
economic structure of the pharmaceutical industry, including the 
regulatory system, protection of the patent monopoly and 
anticipation of liability, provides disincentive for further safety 
testing of pharmaceuticals.  Part III puts forth a proposal to 
incentivize post-approval safety testing of pharmaceuticals by 
extending the period of market exclusivity.  Implementation of this 
proposal should result in increased knowledge of the risks of 
marketed pharmaceuticals, improving the safety of these products. 
I. DEFECTIVE DRUGS REACH THE MARKET RESULTING IN HARM 
Extensive safety and efficacy testing is required in order for a 
pharmaceutical to obtain FDA approval for marketing.15  
Nonetheless, adverse drug reactions16 revealed subsequent to FDA 
 13 The financial impact on consumers, resulting from extending the exclusivity period, 
would have to be balanced against the value of increased safety of marketed 
pharmaceuticals resulting from the additional studies in order to determine an optimal 
length of time for the reward.  Balancing of these factors is not the subject of this Note. 
 14 See Gregory J. Glover, The Influence of Market Exclusivity on Drug Availability and 
Medical Innovations, 9 AM. ASS’N PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. J. E312, E315 (2007) (“IP 
rights extended to final, marketable drug products make further, related innovation 
possible. . . .  IP protection of a marketable drug product encourages not only 
development of that product but further development of related innovations to expand 
and improve therapies and cures.”). 
 15 See Michelle Meadows, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe 
and Effective, 36 FDA CONSUMER 19 (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/Fdac/ 
features/2002/402_drug.html (briefly outlining the FDA approval process); see also 21 
C.F.R. § 314 (2008) (providing the federal regulations for new drug approval). 
 16 An adverse drug reaction is “a response to a medicine which is noxious and 
unintended, and which occurs at doses normally used in man.” WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
SAFETY OF MEDICINES: A GUIDE TO DETECTING AND REPORTING ADVERSE DRUG 
REACTIONS, WHY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS NEED TO TAKE ACTION 5 (2002), available at 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2002/WHO_EDM_QSM_2002.2.pdf.  Adverse drug events 
VOL19_BOOK2_KUSHNER 2/18/2009  2:59:29 AM 
2009] INCENTIVIZING POSTMARKETING DRUG TESTING 523 
 
 
approval and products liability suits demonstrate that 
pharmaceuticals approved for marketing may cause harm to their 
users.  Incentivizing pharmaceutical manufacturers to perform 
postmarket safety research would result in increased knowledge of 
those risks, which may be included in improved warning labels, 
thereby enhancing the safety of marketed pharmaceuticals. 
Part A of this section discusses why the current method of 
evaluating the safety of drugs approved for marketing is 
inadequate to maximize their safety.  Part B provides examples of 
marketed pharmaceuticals that had serious risks that would have 
been discoverable through well-designed postmarket studies. 
A. Current Safety Testing of Pharmaceuticals is Inadequate 
Although the FDA is charged with implementing procedures to 
maximize the safety of drugs approved for marketing,17 the 
incidence of adverse drug events demonstrates that defective drugs 
reach the market, resulting in harm.18  Drugs are found to be 
defective most frequently based on the criteria for failure to warn 
of risks associated with use rather than alternative theories of 
design or manufacturing defects.19 
Generally, pharmaceutical manufacturers become aware of 
potential risks associated with use of a drug during clinical trials 
include adverse drug reactions and negative responses to drugs due to error. See Maria-
Jose Otero, Alfonso Dominguez-Gil, Angel A. Bajo, & Jose A. Maderuelo, 
Characteristics Associated with Ability to Prevent Adverse Drug Reactions in 
Hospitalized Patients—A Comment, 19 PHARMACOTHERAPY 1185, 1185 (1999). 
 17 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2000) (delineating 
the mission of the FDA); Meadows, supra note 15 (describing the procedures the FDA 
uses to maximize safety of drugs approved for marketing). 
 18 See Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, 
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 607 
(2005) (discussing the FDA’s inability to address all safety issues prior to products 
entering market); see also Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
Medical Errors: Understanding Adverse Drug Events, Address Before the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (Feb. 1, 2000), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t000201a.html (indicating that some adverse drug 
reactions are due to undiscovered side effects not included in product labelling). 
 19 LARS NOAH & BARBARA NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 523 
(2002). 
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conducted for the purpose of approval by the FDA.20  These risks 
of drug use are included in the package inserts21 and in information 
provided to the prescribing physicians.  Although extensive 
research, including safety and efficacy studies, is required for FDA 
approval to market a pharmaceutical, the research is necessarily 
limited in size, scope and time.22  Consequently, side effects 
occurring at low frequencies, due to longer duration of drug use, 
and occurring in particular subpopulations, are generally not 
discovered in the pre-approval period.23  As a result, the actual 
extent of discoverable risks associated with an FDA-approved drug 
is not known and, therefore, not communicated to prescribing 
physicians or consumers.24 
During the postmarketing period, adverse drug reactions25 
become more apparent due to the more widespread use of the drug 
over a longer period of time in a heterogeneous population.26  The 
incidence of adverse drug reactions illustrates the extent of the 
problem.  Adverse drug reactions ranked between the fourth and 
sixth leading cause of death in the United States27 and comprise 
three percent of hospital admissions.28  Among patients already 
 20 See Woodcock, supra note 18 (noting that more frequent adverse reactions are 
usually detected in clinical trials before drugs go on the market); Struve, supra note 18, at 
587. 
 21 See FDA, Drugs@FDA Instructions: Health Information, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ 
drugsatfda/instructionsHealth.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008) (defining a “Patient 
Package Insert” as containing “information for patients on how to safely use a drug 
product” and a “part of the FDA-approved labeling”). 
 22 See THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 1, at 37–39. 
 23 See Woodcock, supra note 18; Struve, supra note 18, at 597–99; see also William 
M. Sage, Drug Product Liability and Health Care Delivery Systems, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 990 (1988) (noting that adverse drug reactions may depend on individual chemistry 
of the patients and may not be revealed for years). 
 24 The limited sample size and duration of pre-approval studies compromise the ability 
of the FDA to identify safety problems and to reveal low frequency adverse events. See 
THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra note 1, at 37. 
 25 See supra note 16 (defining adverse drug reaction).  
 26 See Woodcock, supra note 18; Struve supra note 18, at 597–99; see also Sage, 
supra note 23. 
 27 See Jason Lazarou, Bruce H. Pomeranz & Paul N. Corey, Incidence of Adverse Drug 
Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1200, 1202 (1998) (citing data from 1994). 
 28 Robert L. Kane, Iatrogenesis: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 5 J. COMMUNITY 
HEALTH 149, 150 (1980). 
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hospitalized, approximately one-third experience an adverse drug 
reaction.29  The annual direct cost of managing adverse drug 
reactions of hospitalized adults is estimated to be between $1.6 and 
$4.2 billion.30  Statistics are not available on adverse drug 
reactions that do not result in hospita
Individual incidents of adverse drug reactions, revealed 
through continued use of approved drugs in the larger population 
over time via spontaneous physician or consumer reports, must be 
reported by the manufacturer to the FDA.31  “This collection of 
voluntarily submitted case reports represents the weakest form of 
epidemiologic evidence . . . .”32  The passive nature of the 
reporting requirement likely results in underreporting of the 
incidence of adverse events.33  In addition, the cause of a reported 
adverse reaction to a drug is not necessarily revealed by individual 
incidents.  Moreover, adverse drug reactions reported over a long 
time frame may fail to reveal a trend in the nature of these events 
and, rather than suggesting a systematic risk, appear idiosyncratic.  
The converse is also possible.  That is, a collection of independent 
adverse events may appear to represent a risk of use of a drug even 
when there is no actual causation. 
Nonetheless, analyses of these data by drug manufacturers and 
the FDA34 sometimes result in changes to the package inserts, 
stronger label warnings, and withdrawal of drugs from the 
 29 Id. 
 30 See D.C. Classen, S.L. Pestotnik, R.S. Evans, J.F. Lloyd & J.P. Burke, Adverse 
Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs, and 
Attributable Mortality, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 301 (1997). 
 31 Postmarketing Reporting of Adverse Drug Experiences, 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c) 
(2008); Other Postmarketing Reports, 21 C.F.R. § 314.81 (2008). 
 32 Bruce M. Psaty & Sheila P. Burke, Protecting the Health of the Public—Institute of 
Medicine Recommendations of Drug Safety, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1753 (2006). 
 33 See Michael A. Friedman, Science for Judges II: The Practice of Epidemiology and 
Administrative Agency Created Science: What is the Value of an FDA Approval in a 
Judicial Matter?, 12  J.L. & POL’Y 559, 570–71 (2004) (suggesting ten percent or less of 
adverse drug events are reported).  Considering that adverse drug events include 
overdosage and misprescription, as well as side effects, secondary effects and 
hypersensitivity, see Otero et al., supra note 25, adverse drug event reporting may be 
overinclusive, as well. 
 34 Of concern is the dependence of the FDA on manufacturers for preapproval drug 
testing, postmarket data collection and reporting. See Sage, supra note 23, at 1020. 
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dru
market.35  Fifty-six of the 548 drugs approved by the FDA 
between 1975 and 1999 were either withdrawn from the market or 
required to include a black-box warning—the strictest warning 
label.36  About four percent of drugs are eventually withdrawn 
from the market, and twenty percent of drugs get black-box 
warnings after approval.37  However, without systematic 
postmarket research, pharmaceuticals may remain on the market 
lacking an appropriate warning of risks because those risks have 
not been revealed via spontaneous reporting.  In addition, useful 
pharmaceuticals may be withdrawn from the market because the 
extent of risk is not correctly evaluated.38  Of particular concern is 
that patients are harmed in the interval between initial FDA 
approval and changes to the package inserts or withdrawal of th
g from the market. 
Data on post-approval adverse drug reactions suggest that 
intentional post-approval testing would likely reveal the same 
adverse effects earlier and, with planned studies, the data would be 
 
 35 See, e.g., FDA, FDA Announces Important Changes and Additional Warnings for 
COX-2 Selective and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs), 
http://www.fda.gov/CDER/Drug/advisory/COX2.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2008) 
en E. Lasser, Paul D. Allen, Steffe J. Woolhandler, David U. Himmelstein, 
ow and the drug is effective in mitigating the symptoms for many multiple 
(announcing FDA’s request for withdrawal of Bextra and that all manufacturers of 
prescription NSAIDs revise their labeling and include more specific risk information in 
package inserts). 
 36 See Kar
Sidney M. Wolfe & David H. Bor, Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals 
for Prescription Medications, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N  2215, 2216 (2002). 
 37 Id. 
 38 For example, Tysabri (natalizumab), a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis, was 
withdrawn from the market after it was associated with the development of usually fatal 
progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy. Burt Adelman, Alfred Sandrock, & Michael 
A. Panzara, Natalizumab and Progressive Multifocal Leukoencephalopathy, 353 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 432, 432 (2005).  The data (three incidences in 3,116 patients treated over 
17.9 months) revealed a risk of 65 fatalities per 100,000 person-years. Joshua T. Cohen & 
Peter J. Neumann, What’s More Dangerous, Your Aspirin or Your Car? Thinking 
Rationally About Drug Risks (and Benefits), 26 HEALTH AFF. 636 (2007).  Because the 
risk is l
sclerosis patients, the FDA reintroduced the drug in 2006, subject to closer risk 
management. See C. Sheridan, Tysabri Back on Market, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 874 
(2006). 
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sts that up to eighty 
more reliable.39  Postmarketing studies for new uses sometimes 
reveal side effects, which were not revealed via pre-approval 
studies.40  However, the FDA does not routinely require additional 
postmarket research.41  In fact, until recently,42 with very few 
exceptions,43 once a drug was approved, the FDA lacked the 
authority to require manufacturers to perform postmarketing 
studies, even those agreed to prior to approval.44  Consequently, of 
the 1,259 postmarketing studies requested, less than 30 percent 
have been initiated.45  While it is “impossible to design an 
absolutely safe drug,”46 the safety of FDA-approved 
pharmaceuticals can be improved by focused research designed to 
reveal additional risks.  One estimate sugge
 
 39 For a comparison of the merits of different study designs see BETH DAWSON & 
Vioxx (APPROVe) Trial Investigators, Cardiovascular Events 
 note 1, at 156 (“[Ninety-one] percent of 
safety studies. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 
g has been approved based only on animal studies, (3) for the purpose of 
(4) to determine if there are grounds to revoke 
 (2007) (presenting data on the status of open commitments for 
y the FDA, as of September 30, 2006, as reported in the 
ROBERT G. TRAPP, BASIC AND CLINICAL BIOSTATISTICS 19–21 (McGraw-Hill Professional, 
2004). 
 40 Vioxx, for example, was FDA-approved for treatment of pain and inflammation.  A 
clinical trial to evaluate Vioxx for prevention of recurrent colon polyps revealed serious 
adverse cardiovascular effects. See Robert S. Bresalier, Robert S. Sandler, Hui Quan, 
James A. Bolognese, Bettina Oxenius, Devin Horgan, Christopher Lines, Robert Riddell, 
Dion Morton, Angel Lanas, Marvin A. Konstam, John A. Baron, for the Adenomatous 
Polyp Prevention on 
Associated with Rofecoxib in a Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, 352 N. ENG. 
J. MED. 1092 (2005). 
 41 See THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra
postmarketing commitments between 1990 and 2004 were requested by the agency rather 
than being required by statute or regulation”). 
 42 The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 gives the FDA the 
authority to fine pharmaceutical manufacturers who fail to implement FDA-directed post-
approval 
Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
 43 See Stephen J. Schanz, Pharmaceutical Postmarket Review: Fact of Fiction, 62 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 493, 494 (2007) (noting that the FDA can require a postmarketing 
study (1) to verify clinical benefits of drug approved via the accelerated process, (2) 
when a dru
marketing a drug for use in children, 
approval). 
 44 See Psaty, supra note 32, at 1753. 
 45 See Jerry Avorn, Paying for Drug Approvals—Who’s Using Whom?, 356 N. ENG. J. 
MED. 1697, 1698
postmarketing studies requested b
Federal Register). 
 46 Sage, supra note 23, at 990. 
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48 xt section, 
 the post-
lier, and with greater 
con
that 
clin
percent of adverse drug reactions could be predicted, most of 
which could be prevented by further study.47 
The FDA primarily relies on analyses of adverse drug reactions 
over a long time frame to reveal additional risks of approved 
pharmaceuticals, even though such reactions are underreported and 
fail to establish causation.   As explained in the ne
systematic evaluation of pharmaceutical safety during
approval period would reveal risks ear
fidence of accuracy, thereby reducing harm to patients. 
B. Some Risks of FDA-Approved Pharmaceuticals Are 
Discoverable by Postmarket Research 
A review of data on adverse drug reactions suggests 
ical studies performed with the purpose of evaluating the risk 
of some of those reactions would have revealed them earlier.  The 
following are just a few examples of pharmaceuticals for which 
post-approval testing may have revealed important safety data. 
Vioxx (rofecoxib), a product of Merck & Co., Inc., is a 
nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (“NSAID”),49 which was 
FDA-approved in 1999 to treat pain associated primarily with 
osteoarthritis.50  Although there were early indications of serious 
adverse cardiovascular events associated with use of Vioxx, Merck 
asserted that the data was inconclusive.51  Based on increased risk 
 
 47 See MILTON MORRIS SILVERMAN & PHILIP LEE, PILLS, PROFITS AND POLITICS 266 
(University of California Press, 1974). 
 48 See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. 
 49 See Chronic Pain Medical Glossary, http://www.pbs.org/secondopinion/episodes/ 
xib and Naproxen in Patients 
 the naproxen arm of the study). 
chronicpain/medicalglossary/story425.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2008) (defining NSAID 
as a “[c]lass of medication, which does not contain steroids, that is often used as the 
initial pharmacological therapy for common inflammation . . .”). 
 50 See Letter from Dr. Robert J. DeLap to Dr. Robert E. Silverman (May 20, 1999) (on 
file with the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/99/021042_52_vioxx_appltr.pdf. 
 51 See Claire Bombardier, Loren Laine, Alise Reicin, Deborah Shapiro, Ruben Burgos-
Vargas, Barry Davis, Richard Day, Marcos Bosi Ferraz, Christopher J. Hawkey, Marc C. 
Hochberg, Tore K. Kvien, Thomas J. Schnitzer, for The VIGOR Study Group, 
Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofeco
with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1520, 1523, 1526–27 (2000) (asserting 
that the apparent elevation in cardiovascular events with Vioxx use are consistent with a 
cardioprotective effect in
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Vioxx] well 
bef
 
rev
of adverse cardiovascular events revealed during a study for a new 
use of the drug, Vioxx was voluntarily withdrawn from the market 
in 2004.52  At about the same time, a study to determine the cancer 
prevention effects of Celebrex, Pfizer’s competing drug in the 
same class, revealed similar cardiovascular risks.53  “Many drug-
safety researchers believe . . . that appropriately conducted studies 
would have revealed the cardiovascular toxicity of [
ore the end of its 5-year run.”54  A centralized data network55 
could have detected a risk of serious cardiovascular events 
associated with Vioxx after less than three months, allowing for 
the recommendation of targeted follow-up research.56 
With Rezulin (troglitazone), concerns about a risk of liver 
toxicity prior to FDA approval57 might have suggested the need for 
post-approval safety research.  Rezulin, a Warner-Lambert 
product, was FDA-approved in 1997 for the treatment of Type II 
diabetes.58  Continued Rezulin use in over a million people
ealed a high occurrence of acute liver toxicity amongst users.59  
In March 2000, the FDA requested that the manufacturer withdraw 
 
 52 See FDA Issues Public Health Advisory on Vioxx as its Manufacturer Voluntarily 
Withdraws the Product, FDA NEWS, Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/ 
 21-042, at 4 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at 
g in order to identify a potential risk which could be 
Pendulum Swing or Systematic 
hallenges for FDA, Presentation at the Institute of Medicine Forum, 
 Be Withdrawn from the Market, HHS NEWS, Mar. 21, 2000, 
997), http://www.fda.gov/cder/ 
2004/NEW01122.html. 
 53 Memorandum from John K. Jenkins, Director, FDA Office of New Drugs, and Paul 
J. Seligman, Director, Office of Pharmacoepidemiology and Statistical Science, to NDA 
files 20-998, 21-156, 21-341,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/cox2/nsaiddecisionmemo.pdf. 
 54 Avorn, supra note 45, at 1699. 
 55 This would be a mechanism of systematically collecting, collating, and analyzing 
adverse events associated with a dru
addressed by a postmarket study. 
 56 Mark McClellan, Drug Safety Reform at the FDA—
Improvement?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1700, 1702 (2007) (citing R. Platt, The Future of 
Drug Safety—C
Washington, DC (Mar. 12, 2007)). 
 57 See Rezulin to
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00721.html. 
 58 See Drug Approvals for August 1997 (Oct. 3, 1
da/da0897.htm. 
 59 David Willman, FDA Urged to Heed Warnings on Rezulin, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 
1999, at A4. 
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Rezulin from the market.60  Focused postmarket clinical research 
conducted at the onset of FDA-approval could have saved lives.61 
Unlike Vioxx or Rezulin, there were few concerns about the 
safety of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”) when 
they first came on the market.  SSRIs were thought to be a safer 
alternative to other classes of antidepressants.62  SSRIs are a class 
of antidepressant drugs used to treat major depressive disorder 
(“MDD”) and other psychiatric disorders.63  The first SSRI 
approved by the FDA in 1987 was Prozac (fluoxetine), 
manufactured by Eli Lilly.64  By 1990, there was some indication 
that patients prescribed SSRIs were prone to suicidal ideation.65  
While there were a number of subsequent reports of suicidal 
ideation associated with SSRI use in depressed patients,66 the 
 60 See Rezulin to Be Withdrawn from the Market, HHS NEWS, Mar. 21, 2000, 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00721.html. 
 61 See Holcomb B. Noble, Removal of Diabetes Drug Meets with Mixed Feelings, N.Y. 
mparative Benefits and Harms of Second-
essants/SSRIPHA200410.htm. 
RUG L.J. 273, 274 (2002).  Other SSRIs include Zoloft (sertraline), Paxil 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at F7 (noting that sixty-three people had died from Rezulin use 
prior to the FDA’s request of withdrawal of Rezulin from the market). 
 62 See, e.g., Gerald Gartlehner et al., Co
Generation Antidepressants: Background Paper for the American College of Physicians, 
149 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 734, 734 (2008). 
 63 See FDA Public Health Advisory, Suicidality in Children and Adolescents Being 
Treated With Antidepressant Medications (Oct. 15, 2004),  http://www.fda.gov/cder/ 
drug/antidepr
 64 See Andrew E. Falsetti, Fluoxetine-Induced Suicidal Ideation: An Examination of 
the Medical Literature, Case Law, and the Legal Liability of Drug Manufacturers, 57 
FOOD & D
(paroxetine), Luvox (fluvoxamine), Celexa (citalopram), and Lexapro (excitalopram 
oxalate). Id. 
 65 See Martin H. Teicher, Carol Glod & Jonathan O. Cole, Emergence of Intense 
Suicidal Preoccupation During Fluoxetine Treatment, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 207, 207–
10 (1990). 
 66 See, e.g., Timothy D. Brewerton, Fluoxetine-Induced Suicidality, Serotonin, and 
Seasonality, 30 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 190, 190–96 (1991); Guy Chouinard, 
Fluoxetine and Preoccupation with Suicide, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1258, 1258–59 
(1991); John Downs et al., Preoccupation with Suicide in Patients Treated with 
Fluoxetine, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1090, 1090–91 (1991); Cynthia E. Hoover, 
Additional Cases of Suicidal Ideation Associated with Fluoxetine, 147 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1570, 1570–71 (1990); Laszlo A. Papp & Jack M. Gorman, Suicidal 
Preoccupation During Fluoxetine Treatment, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1380, 1380 (1990); 
Anthony J. Rothschild & Carol A. Locke, Reexposure to Fluoxetine After Serious Suicide 
Attempts by Three Patients: The Role of Akathisia, 52 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 491, 491–
93 (1991); Gary D. Tollefson, Fluoxetine and Suicidal Ideation, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1691 (1990). 
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ons in the affected patients, a link between 
SSR
reports seemed to be sparse compared to the number of patients 
who had been prescribed an SSRI.67  In part due to the paucity of 
reports of suicidal ideation compared to the number of patients 
taking SSRIs, but also because of confounding factors such as the 
association of suicidal ideation with depression and concomitant 
use of other medicati
Is and suicidal ideation could not be established without 
controlled prospective studies.68  Until 1997, the FDA maintained 
that there was no credible link between SSRIs and suicidal 
ideation, as a result of continued monitoring of adverse drug 
reactions to SSRIs.69 
Although SSRIs were not initially approved for use in the 
pediatric population, physicians prescribed SSRIs for children.70  It 
was not until there were indications that children and adolescents 
were vulnerable to suicidal ideation while taking SSRIs that the 
FDA convened a group of experts to perform a meta-analysis of 
 
 67 See, e.g., Rothschild & Locke, supra note 66, at 493 (reporting on suicide ideation in 
pra note 66, at 1692. 
 
ibe FDA-approved drugs for non-FDA approved 
 judgment, the prescription is appropriate.  This practice is called “off-label” 
 n.2 (1998). 
3 patients, of approximately 1500 treated).  For comparison, suicide ideation appears in 
the population of primary care patients at a prevalence of one to ten percent. See H.C. 
Schulberg et al., Preventing Suicide in Primary Care Patients: The Primary Care 
Physician’s Role, 26 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 337 (2004). 
 68 See S.R. Ahmad, USA: Fluoxetine “Not Linked to Suicide”, 338 LANCET 875, 875–
76 (1991); see also Tollefson, su
 69 See Motus v. Pfizer, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing 
FDA’s failure to find causal link between Prozac and suicidal ideation).  Meta-analysis of 
available data failed to demonstrate a link between SSRI prescription and suicidal 
ideation. Marie-Therese Walsh & Timothy G. Dinan, Selective Serotonin Reuptake 
Inhibitors and Violence: a Review of the Available Evidence, 104 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA 
SCANDINAVICA 84, 88 (2001). 
 70 See Rushton et al., Pediatrician and Family Physician Prescription of Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors, 105 PEDIATRICS e82, e82 (2000); Miller v. Pfizer, 196 F. 
Supp. 2d 1095, 1104 (2002) (quoting Thomas Laughren, a senior FDA official, saying 
“we have no data for [Zoloft] in children . . . and if this drug were to be approved, it is 
likely that some clinicians will want to use this drug in children,” at a 
Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee meeting); see also FDA, FDA
Proposed Medication Guide: About Using Antidepressants in Children or Teenagers, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/ssrimedicationguide.htm (updated May 2, 
2007).  A physician may legally prescr
uses if, in his
use. See James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed 
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 71
VOL19_BOOK2_KUSHNER 2/18/2009  2:59:29 AM 
532 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 19:519 
 
data
 
ave minimized harm to patients and 
saved lives. 
er 
eutical 
man
 
 from previous studies.71  Analysis of previous studies 
suggested a small risk of suicidal ideation in pediatric patients 
prescribed SSRIs.72  As a result, the FDA required changes to the 
labeling of SSRIs to include warning statements “alert[ing] health 
care providers to an increased risk of suicidality . . . in children and 
adolescents.”73
These examples demonstrate the value of systematic safety 
research of pharmaceuticals in the post-approval period.  Had these 
drugs been so evaluated, risks would have been revealed sooner.  
Timely changes to the warning labels or earlier withdrawal of the 
drug from the market would h
The next part of this Note explains why the costs involved in 
pharmaceutical development, marketing, and ensuring consum
safety are not adequately balanced by incentives to pharmac
ufacturers to continue evaluating the safety of their drugs 
subsequent to FDA approval. 
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF REGULATION DISINCENTIVIZES 
CONTINUED SAFETY TESTING OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
In the pharmaceutical industry, the rewards of market 
exclusivity guaranteed to a patented drug are dampened by the 
length of time necessary to develop and evaluate the product for 
safety and efficacy.  A patent is awarded to an inventor of a 
product or process to reward innovation with market exclusivity.74  
Theoretically, the promise of market exclusivity spurs 
technological advances.75  Market exclusivity provides the 
patentee (or licensee) with a limited time period during which 
 71 See FDA Public Health Advisory, Suicidality in Children and Adolescents Being 
tions (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/ 
id
urk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
 the purposes of patent law is to encourage invention). 
Treated with Antidepressant Medica
ant epressants/SSRIPHA200410.htm. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id.; see also FDA, Antidepressant Use in Children, Adolescents, and Adults 
(May 2, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/default.htm . 
 74 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
 75 Dan L. B
1597 (2003) (noting that one of
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com
 for FDA approval.  
Yet
umer base and does 
little to protect against products liability suits. 
underpinning 
the 
petition in the market is reduced, thereby increasing the 
potential profitability of the product.76  As University of Chicago 
School of Law Professor Richard Epstein notes, “[t]he medical 
advances of the past 30 years are not just a matter of dumb luck.  
They are very heavily dependent on the patent law, pricing 
freedom, and marketing strategies that have allowed these firms to 
bring a wide variety of vital products to market.”77 
Both the expense and duration of testing a drug to obtain FDA 
approval for marketing impinges on the patent monopoly as the 
drug cannot be sold prior to approval.78  Thus, there is little 
incentive for a pharmaceutical manufacturer to invest time and 
money into safety testing beyond that required
, the FDA relies on pharmaceutical manufacturers to conduct 
most of the research on the safety and efficacy of their 
medications.79  Once a drug is FDA-approved, there is little 
economic incentive for a manufacturer to perform ongoing 
postmarket testing80 because information revealed by postmarket 
testing has the potential of restricting the cons
This section discusses three economic reasons 
lack of additional safety testing of pharmaceuticals by their 
manufacturers: (A) a desire not to impinge upon the exclusive 
marketing period established by the patent grant, (B) desire not to 
shrink the market for the drug, and (C) a failure of additional 
testing to reduce the risk of products liability. 
 
 76 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
. 
AGE 127 (4th ed. 2006) (“Patent law provides a market-driven incentive to invest in 
innovation, by allowing the inventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of her 
invention.”). 
 77 Epstein, supra note 4. 
 78 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006)
 79 See Sage, supra note 23, at 1019. 
 80 See Jerry Avorn, Dangerous Deception—Hiding the Evidence of Adverse Drug 
Effects, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2169, 2170 (2006) (“It is naïve to expect companies to 
voluntarily fund studies that could sink lucrative products . . . .”). 
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A. Desire Not to Lose Too Much Exclusivity Period 
The Patent Act81 grants the pa ent tee the right to exclude others 
from making, selling, or using the patented product for twenty 
years from the filing date.82  This exclusivity period provides 
economic reward for innovation83 by eliminating much of the 
competition for a limited time period.84  A patent does not grant 
the right to market the patented product;85 pharmaceuticals require 
FDA approval prior to marketing.86 
Every new prescription drug requires FDA approval prior to 
entry into interstate commerce.87  The process between patenting a 
potential new drug and FDA approval is lengthy and involves 
considerable expense.  The lag time between patenting and FDA 
approval is typically ten to twelve years.88  An application to the 
FDA to market a new drug must follow “adequate and well-
controlled” studies and provide “substantial evidence” of safety 
and efficacy of the new drug.89  In addition to laboratory research, 
as many as sixty separate human trials may be required prior to 
FDA approval.90  This process erodes the patent term, leaving the 
 81 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006). 
 82 Id. § 154(a)(2).  
 83 The impact of a shortened exclusivity period on pharmaceutical drug innovation is 
discussed elsewhere and not the subject of this note. See, e.g., James J. Wheaton, Generic 
Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation:  The Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433, 449–50 (1986). 
 84 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 76, at 126–27. 
 85 See Herman v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579, 584–85 (6th Cir. 1911) (“A 
the grant of a right to make or use or sell.  It does not, directly or indirectly, 
ed ld e c.
288 n.104 (D. Mass. 2004). A “blocking patent 
JAMES T. HUIE, STRATEGIC BALANCING OF PATENT AND 
patent is not 
imply any such right.  It grants only the right to exclude others.”)  Marketing of a 
patent  product cou  be blocked by a prior patent. Se Amgen, In  v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 202, 
situation” arises when an improvement is patented such that the original patent owner can 
prevent the owner of the improvement patent from using the improved product. See id. 
 86 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
 87 See id. 
 88 DENNIS S. FERNANDEZ & 
FDA APPROVAL PROCESSES TO MAXIMIZE MARKET EXCLUSIVITY 5, 
http://www.iploft.com/PTO-FDA.pdf. 
 89 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d); see also Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, 412 
U.S. 609, 617–18 (1973) (interpreting “adequate safety and efficacy testing” and 
affirming the authority of the FDA to determine whether a drug has met the appropriate 
standards for approval). 
 90 See Epstein, supra note 4. 
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$50
 development is exacerbated 
by 
al to marketing. 
 
pharmaceutical manufacturer with a shorter period of market 
exclusivity. 
In addition, the cost of developing, patenting, and obtaining 
government approval for a new drug can be staggering.  Estimates 
of the cost of taking a drug from discovery to market range from
0 million to over $2 billion.91  The cost of drug development is 
correlated with the duration of the FDA approval process.  That is, 
when fewer human studies or human studies of shorter duration are 
required for FDA approval of a drug, the cost of development is 
lower.92  Of course, a shorter FDA approval process leaves more 
time of market exclusivity associated with the patent term as well. 
The effect of the high cost of drug
the low rate of success.  As few as one in ten thousand potential 
drugs may reach the market.93  Approximately ten percent of drugs 
FDA-approved for testing in humans are approved for marketing.94  
Thus, a tiny fraction of drugs brought through the process of 
discovery, patenting, and research and development make it 
through FDA approv
Following patent expiration, the profits generated from market 
exclusivity associated with a new drug are severely diminished by 
competition from generic products.95  Because profitability of a 
drug is greatest during the exclusivity period, there is strong 
 91 See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug 
on, but varies 
Hansen & H.G. Grabowski, The 
 a drug to market at $900 
id Noonan, Why Drugs Cost So Much, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, at 22, 26 
13 (Aug. 1981), available at 
lopment Programs Growing in Size and 
owing patent expiration . . . .”). 
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 427 (2006) (estimating 
the average cost of drug development to be between $839 and $868 milli
from $479 million to $2.119 billion); J.A. DiMasi, R.W. 
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 
(2003) (estimating the average cost of developing a drug at $802 million); Friedman, 
supra note 33, at 560–62 (2004) (estimating the cost of bringing
million); Dav
(estimating the cost of developing a single new drug at over $500 million). 
 92 See Adams & Brantner, supra note 91, at 422 tbl.1. 
 93 See Office of Technology Assessment (U.S. Government Printing Office), The 
Patent-Term Extension and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_5/DATA/1981/8119.pdf. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See John F. Niblack, Why are Drug Deve
Cost? A View From the Industry, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 153 (1997) (“Sales of a 
patented drug product by the original sponsor-innovator . . . can fall by fifty-to-eighty 
percent in the first year foll
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elev
motivation to reduce the portion of the patent term lost to the FDA 
approval process.96 
Recognizing the tension between safety testing and patent 
reward for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry,97 in 1984 
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act,98 which includes a 
provision for extending market exclusivity.99  The Hatch-Waxman 
Act allows the FDA to extend the term of one patent for a new 
drug following approval of a New Drug Application (“NDA”) for 
that drug to compensate for a portion of the time a drug is being 
studied and reviewed for FDA approval, up to five years.100  
Partially as a result of this provision, the effective patent monopoly 
of a pharmaceutical has increased from an average of 8.1 years in 
1980 to fourteen years in 2000.101  Still, there is a lag of about 
en years between patent award and FDA approval for 
marketing for the typical pharmaceutical.102  During this time, the 
patent has been disclosed and there is ample opportunity for 
competitors to develop non-infringing competing products.103  
Loss of market exclusivity time, coupled with the potential for 
competing products to emerge, prompts pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to minimize the duration of pre-approval testing. 
During the time period prior to FDA approval, the drug is not 
profitable for the manufacturer because it is not being sold.  In 
addition, considerable funds are being expended for safety and 
efficacy testing.104  Moreover, the manufacturer is risking the 
 
 96 See FERNANDEZ & HUIE, supra note 88, at 6 (describing methods drug companies 
use to reduce the portion of the patent term lost to the FDA approval process). 
 97 See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
ice Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
e 
 MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE 
ic.” PTO Records and Files of the Patent 
C.F.R. § 1.11(a) (2008).  This can alert competitors to a 
 98 Drug Pr
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156 and 271(e) (2006)). 
 99 Se 35 U.S.C. § 156. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH, RX R&D
DRUG INDUSTRY’S R&D “SCARE CARD” 2 (2001), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFDC.PDF. 
 102 See FERNANDEZ & HUIE, supra note 88, at 1. 
 103 Once a patent has been issued, “[t]he specification, drawings and all papers relating 
to the file . . . are open to inspection by the publ
and Trademark Office Rule, 37 
new market or otherwise spur competitors to develop non-infringing competing products. 
 104 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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the period of exclusivity is the 
mo
arket. 
benefit.  For example, Tysabri (natalizumab), a drug used to 
possibilities that the drug will prove insufficiently safe or effective 
to obtain FDA approval and that a competing drug will come to the 
market during this time.  Further, 
st profitable period for a pharmaceutical.105  For these reasons, 
a pharmaceutical manufacturer has considerable economic 
motivation to minimize the time of pre-approval safety and 
efficacy research.  In fact, pharmaceutical manufacturers have 
supported legislation to charge themselves user fees to supplement 
resources to the FDA in order to expedite approval of new 
drugs.106  These economic factors disincentivize pharmaceutical 
companies from performing studies, beyond those required for 
FDA approval, if those studies would further delay introduction of 
the drug to the m
Once a drug is FDA-approved, the incentive to invest 
additional time and financial resources in ongoing safety testing is 
further diminished.  Continued safety testing may provide little 
economic reward.  As explained in section B, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers may be reluctant to perform additional studies that 
may reveal risks that would shrink their potential market and, 
thereby, further reduce the profitability of such drugs. 
B. Desire Not to Shrink Market as Result of Narrowing Consumer 
Base 
When pharmaceutical manufacturers perform additional 
research into the safety of their products, they risk revealing 
information that may have the effect of narrowing their consumer 
base.  Risks associated with a drug may have a general negative 
effect on the desire of patients to use that drug, even for those 
people not at risk or for whom the drug confers a significant 
mitigate the symptoms of multiple sclerosis, was voluntarily 
 
 105 See Epstein, supra note 4. 
 106 See Margaret Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, 
 
vorn, supra note 45, at 1697. 
Risk Signals, Preemption, and the Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347, 351 
(2008).  Many detractors of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act suggest that it causes the 
FDA to be accountable to the pharmaceutical industry. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.); see also A
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; over fifteen 
per
nistered at high doses, suggesting 
phy
Though all anemia treatments showed a drop in sales, the decline 
 
withdrawn from the market in 2005, after several incidences of 
progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy.107  After 
reintroduction of the drug onto the market in 2006, a survey of 
multiple sclerosis patients indicated that more than half of those 
using Tysabri would likely continue to take the drug if it were 
shown to have a fatality risk of one in one-thousand
cent would likely continue to take the drug with a fatality risk 
of one in one-hundred.108  Although the actual risk of fatality may 
be less than one in one-thousand, and the drug significantly 
reduces multiple sclerosis symptoms, less than twenty-five percent 
of patients who used Tysabri before its withdrawal from the market 
resumed taking it after the drug was reintroduced.109  In this case, 
the news of a small (although serious) risk resulted in a seventy-
five percent reduction in the use of a beneficial drug. 
Such risks may also negatively affect physicians’ prescribing 
behavior.110  This would be especially true if there were similar 
alternative drugs available.  For example, Amgen lost thirty-two 
percent of its share of the anemia drug market after its drug 
Aranesp was associated with a risk of potentially fatal 
cardiovascular events when admi
sicians opted to prescribe alternative anemia drugs.111  A 
subsequent meta-analysis of a number of studies shows that 
members of this class of drugs, which includes Johnson & 
Johnson’s Procrit, increase the incidence of blood clots in cancer 
patients being treated for anemia resulting from chemotherapy.112  
 107 Adelman et al., supra note 38. 
 108 See John E. Calfee, A Representative Survey of M.S. Patients on Attitudes Toward 
the Benefits and Risks of Drug Therapy, 2006 AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REG. 
le at http://www.issuelab.org/click/download2/representative_survey 
rke, Patients, Doctors Still Leery of Biogen’s MS Drug, REUTERS, Oct. 
06, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/ 
38680720061023. 
STUD. 10, availab
_of_ms_patients_on_attitudes_toward_the_benefits_and_risks_of_drug_therapy/ms_pati
ent_attitudes.pdf. 
 109 See Toni Cla
23, 20
idUSN23
 110 See, e.g., id. 
 111 See Reuters, Anemia Drugs May Raise Risk of Death, BOSTON.COM, Feb. 27, 2008, 
http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2008/02/27/anemia_drugs_may_raise
_risk_of_death/. 
 112 Id. 
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ng such studies.  If the direct expenses 
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in sales for Aranesp in 2007 was more than two-fold that of the 
other marketed anemia drugs.113 
Similarly, the competitive battle between the cox-2 inhibitors, 
Vioxx and Celebrex, may h
erform the studies to address the potential cardiovascular risks 
of Vioxx.114  Although both drugs are in the same class of cox-2 
inhibitors and presumably have similar cardiovascular risks,115 a 
demonstration of cardiovascular risk associated with Vioxx, but 
not Celebrex, might have been expected to result in a reduction of 
the market share for Vioxx. 
The potential economic impact of safety studies revealing a 
risk that would reduce the consumer base serves as an economic 
disincentive for performi
and the expense of the effects of additional safety testin
counter-balanced by a reduction in expenses associate
defending products liability suit
nomically advantageous.  However, as discussed in the next 
section, the cost of products liability risk may not be reduced by 
additional safety testing. 
C. Expense of Additional Testing Not Balanced by Cost of 
Products Liability Risk 
Of course, the safety and efficacy testing required for FDA 
approval is necessary to ensure consumer safety.116  However, 
FDA approval does not ensure the safety of the drug.117  
Continuing use of a drug amongst a heterogeneous population can 
 113 Id. 
ne Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for Pain 
um from John K. Jenkins, M.D. & 
gov/cder/drug/infopage/COX2/NSAIDdecisionMemo.pdf (finding 
 and accompanying text. 
 114 See Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and 
Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 942 (2007).  Cardiovascular risks of Vioxx 
were revealed by studies to demonstrate increased gastrointestinal safety of Vioxx 
compared to less specific pain relievers and studies for additional uses of the drug. See id. 
at 948.  Similar studies were never performed on Celebrex. See id. at 945. 
 115 See Barry Meier et al., Medici
Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at A2; Memorand
Paul J. Seligman, M.D., M.P.H. through Steen Galson, M.D., M.P.H. 10 (Apr. 6, 2005), 
http://www.fda.
Celebrex and Vioxx are “associated with an increased risk of serious CV events”). 
 116 See Meadows, supra note 15. 
 117 See supra notes 17–24
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uticals is such that a 
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reveal risks that were not made apparent by earlier human 
studies.118  Moreover, the nature of pharmace
rmaceutical product can never be “safe” by ordinary standards 
of product liability.119  Pharmaceuticals work by interacting with 
the human body.  As a result of variation within the human 
population, each individual is unique such that a “safe” 
pharmaceutical may cause undesirable effects in individuals with 
certain common characteristics120 as well as undesirable 
idiosyncratic effects in unique individuals.121 
Many pharmaceutical products liability cases are based on 
information that becomes apparent subsequent to initial F
roval for marketing.122  Theoretically, the threat of products 
liability is an attempt to correct for imperfect information.123  By 
“promoting information development,” the threat of products 
liability increases the safety of the product.124  In other words, the 
potential for liability for foreseeable risks considering the state of 
the art at the time of sale motivates pharmaceutical companies to 
identify risks, via continuing study, and warn of those risks.125 
 118 See Woodcock, supra note 18; Struve supra note 18, at 597–99; see also Sage, 
supra note 23. 
 drugs in certain segments of the population are not revealed prior to marketing 
a note 23, at 1015–16 (discussing the lack of availability of 
on when drugs come on the market, as well as other factors, 
rle Labs., 
ts liability, see Steven Shavell, 
y, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). 
 119 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (“The issue of 
foreseeability of risk of harm is more complex in the case of products such as 
prescription drugs . . . .”). 
 120 See Funmilayo O. Ajayi et al., Adverse Drug Reactions: A Review of Relevant 
Factors, 40 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1093, 1094 (2000) (explaining that adverse 
effects of
because pre-approval clinical trials often fail to account for differences among patient 
groups in terms of age, gender, and other factors which may be common to specific 
groups). 
 121 See id. at 1095 (“[G]enetic variability . . . may explain unexpected toxicity 
demonstrated in some individuals after administration of a usual therapeutic dose [of a 
drug].”); Sage, supra note 23. 
 122 See Sage, supr
appropriate informati
contributing to the incidence of adverse events resulting in products liability cases). 
 123 See id. at 1015. 
 124 See id. at 1016. 
 125 See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (indicating 
“there is no duty to warn of unknown or unforeseeable risks”); Feldman v. Lede
479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (limiting liability to risks that were “reasonably knowable”).  
For a discussion of the behavioral effects of produc
Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safet
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 to the significance of the adverse 
eve
130
ceuticals removed Bendectin from the 
Although continued use of a pharmaceutical product over time 
in a large heterogeneous population may reveal adverse effects that 
were not apparent at the time of FDA approval, without continued 
rigorous study it is difficult to evaluate the accumulated data.126  
The result is disagreement as
nts.  At one extreme, the adverse events reveal a risk of drug 
use that the manufacturer fails to include in the product labeling.127  
Alternatively, the adverse events may be idiosyncratic128 or may 
result from consumer misuse.129  However, there may be 
insufficient information to determine whether there is a risk.   
These alternatives are resolvable by continuing post-approval 
safety evaluation of the drug. 
Nonetheless, products liability suits may be brought despite 
clear evaluation and ongoing postmarketing regulatory approval by 
the FDA and compliance by the pharmaceutical manufacturer.  The 
paradigmatic example is that of Bendectin. 
Bendectin was an anti-nausea drug prescribed to pregnant 
women.131  Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer, Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, alleging that Bendectin caused birth defects,132 
even though physicians, scientists and the FDA claimed 
otherwise.133  After fifteen years, over $100 million in litigation 
expenses, and losing about forty percent of the cases against it, 
Merrell Dow Pharma
 
 126 See F.D.A. to Expand Scrutiny of Risks from Drugs After They're  Gardiner Harris, 
Approved for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A17. 
bgroup of individuals sensitive to the drug. See supra note 121 
 
acy, and/or misdosing by the physician and/or patient. See 
nce: The Testimony on Causation in the 
46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993). 
t: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. 
 127 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 128 That is, the reaction to the drug may be due to an individual characteristic of the user 
that fails to indicate a su
and accompanying text. 
 129 Consumer misuse may include, for example, misprescribing by the physician, error 
in dispensing by the pharm
Otero et al., supra note 25. 
 130 See Sage, supra note 23, at 1015. 
 131 See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evide
Bendectin Cases, 
 132 See id. at 4. 
 133 See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the 
Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 477 (1997); Lars Noah, Triage in the 
Nation’s Medicine Cabine
L. REV. 741, 760 (2003). 
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the 
manufacturer with both increased profits due to increased sales or 
higher pricing and reduced costs due to decreased liability.  On the 
market.134  The Bendectin story demonstrates how, even in the 
absence of data demonstrating an unsafe product, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are not shielded from products liability or products 
liability litigation.  Such suits disincentivize pharmaceutical 
manufacturers from postmarket safety testing because evidence of 
safety has little economic value if it does not reduce the costs of 
litigation and liability. 
In addition, compliance with FDA recommendations does not 
protect a pharmaceutical manufacturer from products liability.  
Several state courts apply strict liability standards for failure to 
warn, even when the pharmaceutical manufacturer has no 
knowledge of risk135 and other states apply strict liability standards 
when the manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk.136  
The result is that pharmaceutical manufacturers bear high costs of 
product liability even when some risks are unknown or known and 
not adequately included in warnings approved by the FDA. 
Under the current regulatory system, the benefit of continued 
testing is increased safety to the consumer due to better product 
labeling.  One might expect a safer product to benefit 
contrary, knowledge of increased risks results in decreased sales of 
particular drugs, in part because of fears of liability by physicians 
 
 134 See Green, supra note 133; Noah, supra note 133. 
 135 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1106–07 (Colo. 1976) (“[A] 
manufacturer who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
consumer is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused, even though the seller 
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.”); see also 
Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 600 So.2d 701, 707 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992) (“A 
manufacturer's liability for harm caused by ‘unreasonably dangerous per se’ products 
 
tructive, of potential risk or danger before imposing strict 
to warn.”). 
may be imposed solely on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of a product 
irrespective of the manufacturer's intent, knowledge or conduct.”). 
 136 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 392 (1984) (applying strict 
liability when Lederle knew of the risk of tooth discoloration, but failed to warn on
advice of FDA); see also Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Cal. 1996) 
(“The California courts, either expressly or by implication, have to date required 
knowledge, actual or cons
liability for a failure 
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who
tely of the drugs’ side 
effe
 opt not to prescribe.137  In addition, disclosure of additional 
adverse effects narrows the appropriate market for the drug.138  
Moreover, when pharmaceutical manufacturers reveal additional 
adverse effects of a drug, the result may be increased costs of 
defending products liability suits,139 regardless of the outcome. 
Over time, liability risks of marketed drugs increase.  The 
greater the use of the drug, the more likely adverse reactions will 
be reported,140 resulting in stricter FDA warnings and/or restriction 
of marketing.  Products liability suits based on actual harm, 
potential harm, or failure to warn adequa
cts frequently follow.  Defending these suits is immensely 
expensive and the outcomes are unpredictable.141  Thus, the 
considerable expense of postmarket study would not likely be 
balanced by an economic benefit to the manufacturer derived from 
a reduction in products liability litigation. 
The economic effects of the current regulatory and legal 
system disincentivizes pharmaceutical companies from performing 
safety testing of their products beyond that required for FDA 
approval.  Since the period of market exclusivity enjoyed by a 
pharmaceutical is reduced by the length of time necessary to 
develop and evaluate a product for FDA approval, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers are motivated to reduce the expense and duration of 
pre-approval testing.  Moreover, the expense of postmarket testing 
is not balanced by economic reward.  To the contrary, information 
revealed by postmarket testing may reduce the consumer base and 
fail to reduce the expense of defending against products liability 
suits.  Thus, under the current system, additional safety testing of 
 
 137 See, e.g., Anemia Drugs May Raise Risk of Death, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2008, 
http://www.boston.com/business/healthcare/articles/2008/02/27/anemia_drugs_may_raise
_risk_of_death/ (discussing decrease in sales of Aranesp, in part due to physicians’ 
reluctance to prescribe the drug following a study showing increased risk of blood clots). 
 138 See Green, supra note 133, at 497 (“[W]idespread use of a newly approved drug 
may also provide new information that has implications for expanding or narrowing 
indications for use . . . .”). 
 139 See id. at 468. 
 140 See Woodcock, supra note 18; Struve supra note 18, at 597–99; see also Sage, 
supra note 23. 
 141 See, e.g., supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text (discussing that, despite a 
strong consensus that Bendectin was safe, Merrell Dow spent over $100 million 
defending product liability suits with unpredictable outcomes). 
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o 
a m reward for 
pos
Y 
otential for profit controls the incentive to invest money in 
lopment.142  Profit is potentially greatest during 
ivity.143  Extending the period of exclusivity, 
bec
studies and approval of the study design by the FDA.  
pharmaceuticals may actually be economically disadvantageous t
anufacturer.  A system which provides an economic 
t-approval safety testing would spur such research.  Part III 
proposes a system to reward post-approval safety testing of 
marketed pharmaceuticals with an extension of the period of 
market exclusivity. 
III. SOLUTION: INCENTIVIZE POST-APPROVAL SAFETY TESTING 
WITH EXTENSION OF MARKET EXCLUSIVIT
P
research and deve
periods of exclus
ause it increases profits, will encourage investment in research 
and development.  In particular, it provides economic incentive for 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to voluntarily continue evaluation of 
the safety of the drugs they manufacture and market. 
 
A. The Proposal 
This Note proposes an extension of the period of exclusivity 
for completion of targeted research requested by or approved by 
the FDA.144  Concerns about the risks of an FDA-approved drug 
raised by pre-approval data, reports of adverse drug reactions, or 
new scientific information could be addressed by carefully planned 
prospective human studies.  Such studies could be initiated by the 
drug manufacturer in response to an FDA request to perform such 
Alternatively, a pharmaceutical manufacturer may initiate the 
 
 142 See Timothy J. McCoy, Biomedical Process Patents: Should They Be Restricted by 
& HUIE, supra note 88, at 1. 
Ethical Limitations?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 512 (1992) (explaining profitability of an 
economic monopoly “drives innovation and capital investment in research and 
development . . . .”). 
 143 See Epstein, supra note 4; FERNANDEZ 
 144 Adverse events, internal research or published research may suggest to the 
manufacturer the desirability of additional safety studies.  A manufacturer should be 
allowed to seek FDA approval to perform and complete such studies in exchange for 
extension of the exclusivity period as well. 
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val 
stud
et studies because of the potential 
of FDA-approved third-party research revealing the necessity for 
the reward of 
the 
process by requesting approval of a qualifying study design by the 
FDA.  Under this proposal, pharmaceutical manufacturers who 
complete the FDA approved postmarketing studies and submit 
their data to the FDA would be rewarded by an extension of the 
market exclusivity period.145  The economic incentive of the 
reward of an extension of the exclusivity period would 
complement the current punishment structure for failure to perform 
requested studies, included in the recent Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007.146  Thus, in addition to 
fines for failure to comply with FDA-mandated post-appro
ies, pharmaceutical manufacturers would have economic 
incentives to identify and perform studies, which may or may not 
originate with the FDA.  In that way, this proposal is broader than 
the current punishment structure because it has the potential to 
stimulate the performance of a larger set of appropriate studies. 
In addition, this Note proposes including a provision permitting 
FDA approval of third-party safety testing when manufacturers 
decline to perform FDA-requested studies.  Inclusion of a third-
party safety testing provision would increase the likelihood of 
postmarket study.  Manufacturers would be more cooperative in 
performing requested postmark
additional warnings of risk without the advantage of 
extension of the exclusivity period.  Third-parties could be 
 
 145 The length of time of the increase in the market exclusivity period is not the subject 
of this Note.  There are valid reasons for both longer and shorter time frames.  In 
addition, whether a manufacturer could receive multiple extensions for multiple studies 
on the same pharmaceutical would have to be considered because new safety issues may 
arise for the same drug.  Moreover, some consideration is warranted for extending market 
exclusivity for all pharmaceuticals with the active ingredient tested.  This proposal differs 
from that of Alastair Wood in that the reward would be for performing the study and 
Process, 355 
ended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
sharing the data, and not for producing a “preferred and predefined safety outcome.” 
Alastair J.J. Wood, A Proposal for Radical Changes in the Drug-Approval 
N. ENG. J. MED. 618, 620 (2006).  Also, this proposal differs in that the length of the 
exclusivity period would not be keyed to the financial risk of drug development. Id. at 
621–22. 
 146 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 
Stat. 823 (codified as am
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pharmaceuticals by offering a reward of an extension of 
the 
children despite the lack of adequate dosing, safety and efficacy 
a 150
incentivized to perform requested postmarket studies by provision 
of funding for such studies.147 
B. Extension of Exclusivity is a Successful Incentive 
Implementation of the proposal to stimulate postmarket safety 
testing of 
exclusive marketing period, described in Part III.A, is likely to 
have the desired effect.  Previous implementation of a similar 
process addressing safety of pharmaceuticals in the pediatric 
population serves as a positive example that extension of the 
exclusive marketing period is adequate incentive to stimulate 
research. 
To stimulate pharmaceutical manufacturers to test drugs for 
pediatric use, the Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
Act (“FDAMA”),148 passed by Congress in 1997, included a 
provision for extending market exclusivity for manufacturers who 
evaluated their drug for safety and efficacy in children.149  The 
problem addressed by this Act was the prescription of drugs to 
dat  for the pediatric population.   Because children are 
 
 147 Like the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, third parties could be attracted to 
perform the appropriate studies by earmarking NIH funds for such studies and 
announcing Requests for Applications (“RFAs”). See Best Pharmaceuticals for Children 
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, § 3(3), 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. § 290b (2006)). 
 148 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 
2296 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–92 (Supp. 1997)). 
 149 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (2000).  The main provision, of extension of exclusivity as a 
reward for evaluation in the pediatric population, was renewed with The Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (“BPCA”), passed by Congress in 2002. See generally 
Holly Fernandez Lynch, Give Them What They Want? The Permissibility of Pediatric 
Placebo-Controlled Trials Under the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, 16 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 79 (2007). 
 150 Over sixty-five percent of drugs prescribed to children are approved for use only in 
adults. See Lynch, supra note 149, at 82; see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Committee on 
); Rosemary Roberts, What’s So 
ww.fda.gov/cder/ 
Drugs, Guidelines for the Ethical Conduct of Studies to Evaluate Drugs in Pediatric 
Populations, 95 PEDIATRICS 286, 286 (1995) (noting eighty-one percent of drugs in the 
1991 Physicians’ Desk Reference warn that use in children was not determined to be safe 
or effective or restrict their use to narrow age groups
Special About Children?, Presented at the American College of Toxicology 
22nd Annual Meeting (Nov. 6, 2001), available at http://w
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 could avoid liability for adverse reactions in 
chil
armaceuticals for 
Chi
physiologically different from adults, they sometimes respond 
differently to drugs.151  Until the FDAMA, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers had little economic incentive to perform safety and 
efficacy studies for pediatric prescription of their drugs.152  
Pediatric trials were not required for FDA approval.153  
Manufacturers
dren by not marketing their drugs for pediatric use and 
including a warning that the drug had not been evaluated for 
pediatric use in its product labeling, even though off-label use was 
permitted.154 
The FDAMA provided economic incentive for a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer to conduct safety and efficacy 
testing, in the pediatric population, of an FDA-approved drug by 
rewarding such studies with a six month extension of market 
exclusivity for all products with the active ingredient studied.155  
The reward of the extension of exclusivity is granted in exchange 
for reporting study data and does not depend on the outcome of the 
study.156  Under the 2002 revision of the Best Ph
ldren Act (“BPCA”),157 the FDA can approve the establishment 
of a private foundation, to support third party research on drugs 
 
pediatric/presentation/tox_peds_nov2001/sld005.htm (indicating lack of information for 
pediatric use for about three-quarters of prescription drugs). 
ow to Give Medicine to 
Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002: 
ngressional Refusal to Require 
ide while taking 
g had not been tested in children and was clearly labeled 
a ve not been established.” Id. 
 151 For example, aspirin can cause serious illness in children with chickenpox or 
influenza; barbiturates are relaxants in adults, but stimulants in children; amphetamines 
stimulate adults, but relax children. See Rebecca D. Williams, H
Children, 30 FDA CONSUMER 6, 8–9 (Jan.–Feb. 1996). 
 152 See Christopher-Paul Milne, Exploring the Frontiers of Law and Science: FDAMA’s 
Pediatric Studies Incentive, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 491, 491–93 (2002). 
 153 See Specific Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drugs; Proposed Revision of “Pediatric Use” Subsection in the Labeling, 57 
Fed. Reg. 47,423 (Oct. 16, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
 154 See Lauren Hammer Breslow, The 
The Rise of the Voluntary Incentive Structure and Co
Pediatric Testing, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 133, 142 (2003); see also Miller v. Pfizer, 196 
F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1106 (2002).  Pfizer avoided liability for child’s suic
Zoloft, in part, because the dru
“[s] fety and effectiveness in children ha
 155 See Milne, supra note 152, at 491. 
 156 See generally Breslow, supra note 154, at 155–56. 
 157 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
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 of marketing, as 
.  Alternative solutions, 
ave proved inadequate to 
m 
entive to 
arket studies addressing drug safety 
bec
that do not undergo manufacturer-performed pediatric testing.158  
This can even be done during the patent term.159 
As of March 2004, 346 requests to evaluate prescription drugs 
for pediatric use were received from pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, 6 months of exclusivity granted for 97 drugs, and 
new labels approved for 70.160  These data indicate that 
pharmaceutical companies are induced to perform safety testing in 
exchange for a promise of extended exclusivity
proposed in Part III.A of this Note
discussed in Part III.C of this Note, h
address pharmaceutical safety because they are responsive to har
already caused, do not provide sufficient economic inc
perform postmarket safety studies, and do not stimulate research 
focused on specific questions of product safety. 
C. Alternative Solutions Do Not Work 
1. Products Liability is Insufficient to Ensure Safety 
Products liability is invoked as a mechanism to incentivize 
pharmaceutical companies to perform the safety studies necessary 
to avoid the expense of liability and litigation.161  However, the 
threat of litigation and potential liability has not proven sufficient 
to stimulate voluntary postm
ause the risk of litigation and liability for failure to warn of 
adverse responses to a drug does not necessarily correlate to the 
potential for injury due to drug use.162  As noted above, the cost of 
litigation and liability for Bendectin was considerable, despite over 
 
 158 42 U.S.C. § 290b (2006). 
 159 21 U.S.C. § 355a(n)(1)(A) (2006). 
cesses, Failures; Future 
ntation/FDAMA-FDA%20Persp-
://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/exgrant.htm 
otes 131–134 and accompanying text. 
 160 See Rosemary Roberts, FDA Perspective on FDAMA: Suc
Directions, http://www.fda.gov/cder/pediatric/prese
Roberts2004/sld008.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008).  As of Feb. 19, 2008, 145 drugs 
have been granted pediatric exclusivity. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Drugs to Which 
FDA has Granted Pediatric Exclusivity for Pediatric Studies under Section 505A of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,  http
(last visited Feb. 19, 2008). 
 161 See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text. 
 162 See supra n
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ptive products from the market and 
disi
 drugs, approximately twenty percent of adults 
thirty-five scientific studies demonstrating no elevated risk of birth 
defects with use of the drug.163 
In addition, products liability cases have resulted in the 
unavailability of pharmaceuticals that may have beneficial effects 
which outweigh risks in, at least, a portion of the population.164  
For example, Bendectin, the only anti-nausea drug available for 
pregnant women in 1983, was voluntarily removed from the 
market because of the costs associated with products liability 
litigation.165  Choices of female contraceptives are limited because 
of withdrawal of some contrace
nterest in contraceptive research and development because of 
liability concerns.166  A recombinant Lyme disease vaccine was 
withdrawn from the market because a series of product liability 
cases resulted in bad publicity, causing a drop in demand even 
though the adverse events litigated over were never shown to be 
caused by the vaccine.167 
An unintended effect of products liability cases is a loss of 
confidence in the safety of drugs individuals are prescribed.  In the 
wake of products liability cases revealing serious risks of 
commonly used
 
  See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1354–56 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(summarizing the results of six typical clinical studies showing no statistically significant 
ed Bendectin during 
tates, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 98, 98 
llison Abbott, Lyme Disease: Uphill Struggle, 439 NATURE 524, 524 (2006) 
the 
163
increase in birth defects amongst over 5,000 women prescrib
pregnancy compared to those who were not). 
 164 The potential for products liability may also discourage new product development, 
resulting in social harm caused by the absence of product availability. See Sage, supra 
note 23, at 990. 
 165 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988). 
 166 See David Hubacher, The Checkered History and Bright Future of Intrauterine 
Contraception in the United S
(Mar.–Apr. 2002) (suggesting that limited availability and use of the intrauterine device 
in the United States is due to withdrawal of products from the market in the 1970s and 
1980s, reluctance of companies to develop new devices, as well as other factors not 
entertained in this paper); Sheldon Segal, Introduction, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 329, 330–31 (1997). 
 167 See A
(reporting that products liability suits and bad publicity caused GlaxoSmith Kline to pull 
the vaccine from the market); Emma Hitt, Poor Sales Trigger Vaccine Withdrawal, 8 
NATURE MED. 311 (2002); see also Editorial, When a Vaccine is Safe, 439 NATURE 509 
(2006) (reporting that rumors of nonexistent side effects of the vaccine forced it from 
market). 
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.   
Con
 suits do not constitute a prospective 
wel
viduals harmed by 
juries, they do not 
regularly taking medication worry about the dangers of the drugs 
they are taking; thirteen percent stop using drugs prescribed to 
them; four percent reduce the dosage of drugs they are taking 168
sumer choice to stop using or to reduce the dosage of 
prescription medications can have serious negative consequences 
to their health. 
On the other hand, products liability litigation may encourage 
the inclusion of unwarranted warnings that go beyond what is 
required by the FDA.169  Such
l-designed study enabling the determination of specific risks 
that could be adequately warned against in product labeling.170 
More importantly, the delay in revelation of information 
between FDA approval and products liability cases results in injury 
to individuals.  For example, an FDA epidemiologic study revealed 
that in the five years Vioxx was marketed, the use of Vioxx over 
Celebrex resulted in 27,785 excess acute myocardial infarctions 
and sudden cardiac deaths.171 
While products liability suits allow indi
unsafe drugs to be compensated for their in
replace well-designed prospective studies which might have the 
effect of reducing harm to patients.  Rewarding postmarket safety 
studies of pharmaceuticals with an extension of the exclusive 
marketing period, as this Note proposes, would incentivize 
 
 168 See Harris Interactive, The Public Has Doubts About the Pharmaceutical Industry’s 
Willingness to Publish Safety Information About Their Drugs in a Timely Manner, 
oll of 2,404 US adults conducted in January 2005). 
dial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac Death in Patients Treated with COX-2 
www.fda.gov/CDER/DRUG/infopage/vioxx/vioxxgraham.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 
HARRIS POLL, at 1 (Jan. 18, 2005), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/ 
news/newsletters/wsjhealthnews/WSJOnline_HI_Health-CarePoll2005vol4_iss01.pdf 
(online p
 169 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biologic Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,921, 3,935 (Jan. 24, 2006); Gilhooley, supra note 106, 
at 353. 
 170 See Gilhooley, supra note 106, at 353. (“Product liability suits are a less-than-ideal 
vehicle for determining what type of warning is needed and involve a retrospective 
determination that the drug sponsor did not do enough.”). 
 171 Memorandum from David J. Graham, Associate Director of Science, Office of Drug 
Safety to Paul Seligman, Acting Director, Office of Drug Safety, Risk of Acute 
Myocar
Selective and Non-Selective NSAIDs 9 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at 
http://
2008). 
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nt amendment to the Food, Drug and 
il to 
his 
enforcement has not yet been tested.  However, the 
ly 
new drugs. 
 
pharmaceutical companies to design studies targeted at elucidating 
specific risks associated with the drugs studied. 
2. Fines Become Cost of Doing Business 
The FDA has the ability to request post-approval studies of 
pharmaceuticals.172  Until recently, however, because the agency 
had no enforcement power, these studies went largely 
unperformed.173  Rece
Cosmetics Act allows the FDA to fine manufacturers who fa
perform requested post-approval safety testing.174  T
mechanism of 
maximum fine of $10 million175 is only a small percentage of the 
average cost of drug development.176  Manufacturers may risk the 
possibility of a fine being levied because the expense of a fine may 
be less than the expense of research and the effect of risks revealed 
on the marketing of the pharmaceutical.  That is, the fine may 
become the cost of doing business. 
3. Strengthening Requirements for FDA Approval is Too 
Cost
An alternative to postmarketing research, is to increase the 
extent of safety and efficacy studies required for initial FDA 
approval.  Such studies, however, would result in added delay in 
introducing beneficial drugs to the market.177  In addition, 
increasing the scope and number of pre-approval studies would 
increase the cost of drug development, while the time delay in 
introduction of the drug to the market would decrease profits.  
These conditions decrease manufacturers’ incentives to develop 
 172 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(A) (Supp. 2007); supra notes 44–45 and accompanying 
 text. 
s Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 
(f)(4)(A)(ii). 
arketing Surveillance: A 
. L. 69, 76–77 (2006). 
text. 
 173 See Avorn, supra note 45, at 1699 and accompanying
 174 Food and Drug Amendment
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 175 21 U.S.C. § 333
 176 The average cost of drug development is about $800 million. See supra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
 177 Sean M. Basquill, Prescription Drug Liability and Postm
Modest Proposal, 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL
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DA approval may delay access to 
ben
ks that remain 
unanticipated.  The incentive to study risks revealed in the post-
would be 
 
As one court recognized, “[p]ublic policy favors the 
development and marketing of beneficial new drugs, even though 
some risks . . . might accompany their introduction, because drugs 
can save lives and reduce pain and suffering.”178  Increasing the 
extent of research required for F
eficial drug therapies179 due to the increased time necessary to 
perform these additional studies.  A cost/benefit analysis of impact 
of a reduction in drug review time resulting from implementation 
of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (“PDUFA”)180 suggested an 
overall increase in the health of the population represented by a 
total increase of 180,000 to 310,000 life-years.181  These data 
suggest that a delay in approval time might have a negative impact 
on the health of the population. 
The negative impact of delayed FDA approval may not be 
sufficiently balanced by increased safety of FDA-approved drugs.  
Additional pre-approval safety testing may fail to reveal some 
risks.182  For many drugs, the potential risks are revealed during 
the post-approval period.183  Without the insight of potential risk 
revealed via post-approval use, targeted studies could not be 
designed.  In addition, whatever studies are implemented in the 
pre-approval period would not address any ris
approval period would not only be lacking, but 
diminished because of the further loss of exclusive marketing time 
due to the increased pre-approval period.  This problem is 
 178 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988). 
 179 See Basquill, supra note 177, at 76–77. 
 180 Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (providing for the FDA to charge a fee to 
a prescription drug manufacturer for the FDA approval process).  The recent fee was 
increased in order to provide necessary resources to the FDA in order to shorten the 
approval period. See Prescription Drug User Fee Act Meeting Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 1743, 
: The Case of the Prescription 
on. Research, Working Paper No. 11724, 
1746–47 (Jan. 16, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/Dockets/98fr/07-
122.htm. 
 181 See Tomas J. Philipson, Ernst R. Berndt, Adrian H.B. Gottschalk & Matthew W. 
Strobeck, Assessing the Safety and Efficacy of the FDA
Drug User Fee Acts 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Ec
2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11724. 
 182 See Basquill, supra note 177, at 76–77. 
 183 See Struve, supra note 18, at 598–99 and accompanying footnotes. 
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safety testing of 
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provision gives a credit for “qualified research expenses” and 
“basic research payments” to business entities engaged in research 
addressed by the proposal, in Part III.A, to incentivize post-
approval safety testing targeted at elucidating potential risks 
revealed during the postmarket period, without delaying the 
introduction of pharmaceuticals approved for use. 
4. Tax Incentives Are Not Focused on the Problem 
While tax incentives have been used to affect behavior in 
numerous industries,184 there are a number of disadvantages to 
utilizing a tax incentive185 to increase 
rmaceuticals.  First, there is the political concern about giving a 
tax incentive to an extremely profitable industry.  Second, the loss 
of tax revenue would increase the tax burden (or alternatively 
reduce services) to the entire populace.  Third, there would be no 
simple mechanism for matching the tax incentive to where the 
research would have the most beneficial effect.  That is, it would 
be difficult to target the specific pharmaceutical in need of further 
safety testing in exchange for the tax incentive. 
The current Internal Revenue Code186 allows expenditures on 
research to be treated as a deduction.187  A research tax credit
activities.188  These tax incentives are designed to stimulate 
general research189 relevant to the development of new 
 
 184 See Susan Feigenbaum & Thomas Jenkinson, Government Incentives for Historic 
Preservation, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 117 (1984) (tax incentives have stimulated historic 
 RELATED SUBJECTS—A COMPENDIUM 82, 87–95 (Fund for Public Policy 
o effect on stimulated residential energy 
nerally HOW TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (Henry J. Aaron 
ilitation 
penses” and “basic research payments.” Id. § 41(a). 
 13 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 120. 
preservation programs). But see Salvatore Lazzari, An Economic Evaluation of Federal 
Tax Credits for Residential Energy Conservation, in 7 STUDIES IN TAXATION, PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND
Research 1982) (tax credits have had little to n
conservation). See ge
& Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981) (explaining the impact of taxation on allocation of 
resources in specific areas).   
 185 See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehab
of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 973–74 (1986) (addressing the inefficiency of tax 
incentives). 
 186 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. (2006). 
 187 Id. § 174(a)(1). 
 188 Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a tax credit for “qualified 
research ex
 189 S. REP. NO. 97-144, at
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pha
  
eva
rmaceuticals and are generally not applicable to research on 
already existing pharmaceuticals.190  There is an additional tax 
credit for qualified clinical testing of drugs to treat specific rare 
diseases.191  Thus, these general provisions do not apply to 
postmarket safety testing. 
It would be possible to amend the Internal Revenue Code to 
include a tax credit for postmarket safety testing of 
pharmaceuticals.  However, such a credit would likely be a general 
provision, not directed at performing specific studies in response to 
adverse drug events or scientific evidence suggesting a need to
luate a specific risk of a specific drug.  In addition, an 
important aspect of the research is that it is well-designed to 
address the relevant inquiry.192 To that end, involvement of the 
FDA in the approval of the study design is vital to the goal of 
improving the safety of specifically identified pharmaceuticals.193 
Unlike a tax credit for general postmarketing research, an 
FDA-administered incentive could be aligned to specific interests.  
The patent term extension would be applied to the pharmaceutical 
evaluated.  The mechanism of the provision could be structured 
such that a manufacturer would be required to obtain FDA 
approval to qualify for the incentive. 194  In addition, the provision 
could be activated by a request from the FDA.  The process would 
not involve movement of funding from the government to the 
already profitable pharmaceutical industry.  In fact, the PDUFA195 
requires companies using the FDA approval process to pay a user 
 
  See Nina J. Crimm, A Tax Proposal to Promote Pharmacologic Research, to 
Encourage Conventional Prescription Drug Innovation and Improvement, and to Reduce 
search into utilizing an already existing pharmaceutical for an entirely 
the existing Internal Revenue 
008) (laying out the requirements of an adequate and well-
te 1, at 1. 
maceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, § 
.). 
190
Product Liability Claims, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1069–70 (1994).  It is 
conceivable that re
new application or delivery system would qualify under 
Code. Id. 
 191 See 26 U.S.C § 45C. 
 192 21 C.F.R. §314.126 (2
controlled study). 
 193 See THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY, supra no
 194 Similar to the Best Phar
409I(a), 115 Stat. 1408, 1408–1409 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 195 Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C
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fee.
ax burden of all taxpayers.  On the 
oth
n of the exclusivity period, proposed 
in Part III.A, would have no direct effect on general tax revenues 
or resources allocated to the FDA.  In addition, unlike a tax 
incentive, which addresses a general industry goal, the proposal 
herein would enable tyin to specific well-designed 
stud
196  The current reauthorization of the PDUFA raised the 
amount of that user fee in order to pay for increased costs 
associated with more extensive postmarketing surveillance.197  A 
tax break to manufacturers implementing postmarketing studies 
would effectively reduce the funding to the FDA, especially that 
which is needed to monitor the increased workload due to those 
studies. 
Unlike a tax incentive, a patent term extension would not 
reduce tax revenues.  A reduction in tax revenues may need to be 
balanced by increasing the t
er hand, the potential increased financial burden on consumers 
resulting from higher prices of a drug during an extended 
exclusivity period would be borne by the consumers of the drug 
who are benefiting from its increased safety.  Any financial burden 
on the pharmaceutical company for performing the necessary 
research would be offset by the increased revenue during the 
extended exclusivity period. 
The proposal to incentivize postmarket safety evaluation of 
pharmaceuticals by extensio
g the reward 
ies addressing specific safety concerns of identified 
pharmaceuticals that would be vetted through the FDA for 
approval prior to initiation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Recent products liability suits, withdrawal of pharmaceuticals 
from the market, and changes in product labeling suggests that the 
 
 196 21 U.S.C. § 379h (2006). 
 197 See Prescription Drug User Fee Act Meeting Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 1743, 1750 (Jan. 
16, 2007), available at http://www
FDA’s 5-year PDUFA plan draft
.fda.gov/OHRMS/Dockets/98fr/07-122.htm.  The 
 is available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/pdufa/ 
PDUFA_IV_5yr_plan_draft.pdf. 
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cur
ility litigation. 
harmaceutical manufacturers can be incentivized to perform 
postmarket safety research by rewarding such research with 
extension of market exclusivity.  This incentive has proven to be 
an effective stimulus to induce pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
evaluate FDA-approved drugs for pediatric use.  The mechanism 
proposed herein, modeled on the Best Pharmaceuticals for 
Children Act, provides an economic incentive for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to perform targeted research to evaluate FDA-
approved drugs.  The research would result in increased 
information on the risks of use of specific pharmaceuticals which 
would have a significant impact on the safety of pharmaceutical 
consumers. 
 
rent mechanism for safety evaluation of pharmaceuticals is 
inadequate.  Pharmaceutical manufacturers have little incentive to 
perform postmarket clinical studies to evaluate safety of FDA-
approved drugs.  The FDA’s mechanism to enforce postmarket 
evaluation is currently inadequate as drug companies are likely to 
pay penalties in lieu of conducting postmarket research.  Products 
liability, alone, is insufficient to stimulate pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to avoid litigation by revealing safety indications 
via postmarket research.  In addition, the lack of correlation 
between risks associated with drug use and potential for expense 
associated with litigation removes some value from the threat of 
products liab
P
